A World Leader in Her Own Chosen Field: Aporetics of Knowledge and Indifferance in Pyramid

Map of the Necropolis at Giza



I

The Great Pyramid...is nonetheless able to explain its grand, even Messianic mission, almost unmistakeably.  Not, indeed, by use of any written language, whether hieroglyphic or vulgar, but by aid of the mathematical and physical science of modern times applied to show the significance residing in the exact amount of its ancient length, breadth and angles; a means most efficacious both for preventing the parable being read too soon in the history of an, at first, unlearned world; but for insuring its being correctly read, and by all nations, whien the fulness of prophetic time, in a science age, has at last arrived.

Charles Piazzi Smyth, Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid  (1880)

The Great Pyramid was built to preserve the old knowledge for ever so that, even if the civilization that built it should one day perish, future generations would still be able to learn the truth. The ratios of its dimensions contain all the mathematical formulae which govern the universe. It is a scientific "glyph" which, when meditated upon by an initiate, reveals the secrets of life itself. The layout of the heavens is indicated by the positioning of its blocks. It is a message designed to be read by us in the future.

Tom Martin, Pyramid  (2007)








Simon Schaffer, in his Tarner Lectures of this year collectively entitled "When The Stars Threw Down Their Spears: Histories of Astronomy and Empire," has (probably unwittingly) cast a new and intriguing light on Martinian studies.

In his second lecture, "An Antique Land," Schaffer draws our attention to certain facts which have revolutionary significance for our understanding of Pyramid as a text, and alarming implications for our conceptions of its author.  Schaffer argues with characteristic erudition that astronomy and antiquarianism were indispensible and intertwined prostheses of late Victorian imperialism, and that collaboration between them produced "disorienting" chronologies, i.e. chronological narratives which calibrated other cultures based on their past and present "progress" in astronomy, the "pattern science."  These narratives justified imperial domination as an arrogation of patrimony by describing colonized civilizations as declensions of a primal culture of perfected science, of whom the British where the only worthy descendants.  Quoting Kidd, Schaffer emphasizes that early Victorian antiquarian-astronomers sought "not to establish Indian otherness, but its degenerate affiliation with the British within the universal noarchic family of nations.  Alien dominance could thus be represented as a form of return...to the colonized culture's original condition."

Charles Piazzi Smyth (1819-1900) was one of these Victorian antiquarian-astronomers.  Although generally known for his work in infrared astronomy and wet collodion photography, he is also occasionally remembered for his ambitious and fanatically meticulous surveys of the Great Pyramid.  Piazzi Smyth evolved a comprehensive metrology of space and time from the dimensions of the Pyramid which encompasses, (among other things,) the Pyramid as an index of various astronomical distances and periods and as a monument to a series of weights and measures which approximate those of the Imperial system, including Pyramid inches, Pyramid cubits, and even Pyramid pints.  He imagined these standards existing in a relation of perpetual antagonism to profane, "Cainite" units of measure.  Pyramid metrics were those of the Israelites, not the pagan Egyptians, and therefore had intrinsic religious and moral significance for the British Empire, both as proof that the hand of Providence guided its destiny, and as a justification for cultural chauvanism vis-a-vis, among other things, the recently developed metric system. This is demonstrated rather nicely in his critique of a lecture delivered to the British Association for Science in Bradford in 1873, from Chapter XVI of Our Heritage in the Great Pyramid, entitled "The Sacred Cubit, of the Bible, Opposes the Cainite," which is worth quoting at length.

...the lecturer there, who might have done either thing - elected to hold up to the admiration of his audience, and as the best possible example of a long-lived, well-cared-for...loved and respected, ancient standard of linear measure, not the sacred 25-inch cubit of Seth (and, as we shall show more positively in Chapter XVIII, equally of Noah, Moses, and Solomon), with its lasting monument, the Great Pyramid, central to all the inhabited land-surface of the earth, - but the profane 20.68-inch cubit of both the once idolatrous and now divinely curshed, Egyptians; and of Babylonians, whose boastful city and impious nation have altogether disappeared.  Yet much did the lecturer enlarge on the most exemplary care, far exceeding anything known until very lately among Christian communities, with which metrical commissioners from Egypt, Babylon, Nineveh, and other such idolatrous empires in primeval time, must have travelled about from country to country, with examples of that horrible Cainite cubit for instruction, comparison, and regulation; keeping every one of those heathen kings, governments, and peoples, - whether worshippers of Isis, or Astarte or the Phoenician Fishgod or any other, - true to their ancestral, but anti-Israel's God, covenant in metrology; binding them moreover, for secret and unhallowed reasons, to respect that 20.68 inch cubit and no other....But shall our British people, under the plea of being taught science, in grandly adorned halls where fashion and wealth do congregate, - be exposed to the tempation, the danger of unknowingly admiring, following, and patronising the profane, instead of the sacred, example in metrology?  (355)

While Piazzi Smyth was not the only European proponent of Pyramidal metrology (he had English predecessors and French contemporaries,) he was the most thorough, journeying "on scanty means" with his wife to undertake "four months residence on the Great Pyramid hill" during which he conducted the most precise surveys which had hitherto been made, and took the first photographs of the Pyramid's interior.  In the preface to Our Heritage in the Great Pyramid, he casts himself as the intellectual heir of John Taylor, the Nottingham publisher and amateur pyramidologist who had suggested in The Great Pyramid that the structure propaedeutically incorporated divine ratios and that its builders' system of measure was the progenitor of the Imperial system.  Taylor, in turn, had gotten his data from John Greaves, a seventeenth century professor of geometry who had actually made measurements at Giza.  Greaves was the first to suggest a relationship between Ancient Egyptian and British units of measure, and also influenced Isaac Newton in his composition of that underrated classic, A Dissertation upon the Sacred Cubit of the Jews and the Cubits of several Nations.

Piazzi Smyth's explanation of his intellectual lineage in Egyptological metrology has generally been accepted prima facie.  Schaffer, however, makes the intriguing claim that it was in fact a translation of earlier Pyramid surveys by the Egyptian astronomer Mahmud ("al-Falaki") Ahmad Hamdi which drew Smyth to Egypt.  Al-Falaki ("The Astronomer") was an expert surveyor and astronomer in his own right, educated in Paris and published in European journals.  He had also concluded, based on his own surveys (which were conducted prior to Piazzi Smyth's but considerably after Greaves'), that the Great Pyramid was a metrological monument and that its faces were precisely oriented with respect to the star Sirius, and wrote that "they recall for us the language of our first masters in the sciences."  He may also have been the first to calculate the date of the Pyramid's construction through archeoastronomy (i.e., calculation of the date in the past at which a particular alignment with a star would have existed).   His work was used by Egyptian nationalists like Ali Mubarak in support of a nativist rhetoric about the immemorial greatness of the Egyptian nation and its autochthonous mastery of astronomy and engineering.  Schaffer further claims that Piazzi Smyth performed an "astonishing political reversal" in agreeing that the Pyramid must be a metrological monument but insisting that "the meter, the measure that it embodied, was, of course, British."

While Piazzi Smyth's work has diffuse modern emanations outside of professional archaeology, his metrological theories were officially demolished by the son of one of his close friends, a man generally considered the father of modern (i.e., orthodox) Egyptology, Sir William Flinders Petrie.  Here is Petrie describing the origins of his interest in the pyramids:

A new stir arose when one day I brought back from Smith's bookstall, in 1866, a volume by Piazzi Smyth, Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid. The views, in conjunction with his old friendship for the author, strongly attracted my father, and for some years I was urged on in what seemed so enticing a field of coincidence. I little thought how, fifteen years later, I should reach the "ugly little fact which killed the beautiful theory"; but it was this interest which led my father to encourage me to go out and do the survey of the Great Pyramid. (Petrie, Seventy Years in Archaeology,1932)

Petrie's own survey work demonstrated that Smyth had fudged a number of his figures to make them cohere with his theories about the Messianic significance of the Pyramid, and he helped establish Egyptian archaeology on a systematically materialist foundation.  Petrie is also generally credited with having coined the term "pyramidiot" to refer to people like his old family friend.

Now, with the background established, I will try to illustrate how Schaffer's reflections on the entanglement of astronomy, antiquarianism and empire, and his claim that Piazzi Smyth was attracted to Egypt by the work of el-Falaki, bear on our reading of "Tom Martin's" text. (In the absence of an alternative I have no choice but to propagate the pseudonym.)

II

Aziz gestured for them to sit, settled himself behind his desk, and began to speak; he had a definite Egyptian accent, but his English was fluent.  His tone was indulgent and, Catherine thought, slightly sleazy.  

Tom Martin,  Pyramid

When I chose the scholarly route, I came to understand identities as discursive effects, and therefore opted not to publish anything about the subject in order not to contribute to the problem by inciting more discourse about it.

Joseph A Massad, Desiring Arabs

It is temptingly easy to read Pyramid as an emanation of a discredited and largely forgotten nineteenth-century debate about the moral importance and historical pedigree of standards in measurement, (in both astronomy and surveying,) dressed in a threadbare cloak of modern "pyramidiocy" largely derived from the work of Robert Bauval, Graham Hancock, and other widely acknowledged charlatans.  Such a reading would seem to encompass many of Pyramid's more bizarre moments.  Consider, for instance, Rutherford's revelation in front of the granite coffer:

They walked over to the box and peered in.  Rutherford, consulting his guidebook, muttered its dimensions out loud.  Then suddenly he exclaimed, 'My God!  The imperial measures we still use today in England and America, the inches and feet, are related to the measuring system used in the construction of the pyramid and the coffer!' (329)

Once one realizes that a lively debate existed in the nineteenth century regarding the metrological significance of the Great Pyramid vis a vis the Imperial standards of weight and measure, that is to say, once one realizes that Rutherford's "guidebook" is apparently by Charles Piazzi Smyth, it starts to seem unavoidable to read Pyramid as an unconscious pastiche of revenant imperialist mystifications - especially after the further revelation that the Pyramid is, among other things, a sort of giant transit intstrument. (331)

Similarly, consider Catherine's response to what she reads in her guidebook about the Nazca lines:

'The spider is of particular interest because astronomers have calculated that its postion and the postion of the straight lines adjacent to it serve as a model of the Orion constellation and surrounding stars.' 

Catherine closed the book.  As an astronomer that settled it for her.

'James, whoever made these designs one thing is for sure - they were definitely from a high civilization.  To understand the heavens and to map the Orion constellation like this requires an enormous amount of sophistication' (122)

Superficially, this passage also seems consistent with the theory that one ought to read Pyramid as a myopic recapitulation of a nineteenth-century political astronomy, since Catherine's reasoning represents exactly the strategy of cultural evaluation through chronological calibration which, as Schaffer has demonstrated, was employed by European colonial powers in India, China, and, of course, Egypt. 

However, this interpretation only leads to a series of inescapable contradictions, and when applied in depth generates more questions than it resolves.

Catherine, for instance, is an astronomer.  This makes sense, according to the logic by which, Schaffer has taught us, meridian astronomy was valorized by the British Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries; indeed, she makes many statements, such as the one quoted above, which appear to programatically express the agenda of colonial astronomy.  But the reading becomes problematic in proportion to the depth of our scrutiny.  It turns out, in fact, that Catherine knows virtually nothing about astronomy.  The only positive knowledge she is able to reproduce is a rather threadbare explanation of longitude; granted, she adduces precession as an explanation of the global catastrophe, but Rutherford, intriguingly, already knows exactly what it is and gives a nearly mathematical description of it:

'What do you know about astronomy and the movement of our planet?

"Not a whole lot.  I know the earth rotates on its own axis once every twenty-four hours.  I know it completes a full orbit of the sun roughly every three hundred and sixty-five days and I also know it is tilted away from the plane of the ecliptic and that the tilt varies - it wobbles back and forth between twenty-one and twenty-four degrees - a complete wobble takes forty one thousand years." (253)

Not only is she generally ignorant, but she catastrophically misunderstands Hapgood's theory of earth-crust displacement.  (Hapgood's theory suggests that it is the accumulation of irregularly distributed ice at the earth's poles that causes evolving eccentricity in the rotation of the lithosphere; not their disappearance.  If Hapgood were right, the logical conclusion would be that, in order to save the world, global warming should be accelerated.)  Beyond her technical incompetence, Catherine is completely ignorant of the lineage of the "data" which she and Rutherford "uncover" concerning the Pyramid, specificially of the fact that it all originates with nineteenth century astronomers, and the majority of it comes from Piazzi Smyth.  Thus, while Catherine's status as an astronomer initially seems to fit into a coherent narrative framework (i.e. one refracted, badly, from Victorian "pyramidiocy,") in fact it only generates an irresolvable tension between her professional identification, and her praxis of ignorance (i.e. orthognosis(f)).

Likewise, Rutherford is ostensibly an antiquarian who has previously visited Egypt and, he claims, "I know the orthodox thinking about Ancient Egypt, at least," (300).  It would fit the interpretation sketched above well if he were actually familiar with the tradition of materialist, empiricist archaeology of which Flinders Petrie is the urvater; he might then enact a reversal of what the grand old Egyptologist did to the legacy of Piazzi Smyth and John Taylor by progressing from orthodoxy to mythognosis.  However, like Catherine, he instead exhibits a dual incompetence; first, he does not, in fact, know much about Egypt, as evidenced by his frequent reference to guidebooks.  Second, the knowledge he is able to produce is the kind that orthodox Egyptology supplanted, for which Flinders Petrie coined his felicitous epithet.  Like Catherine, Rutherford's vocation seems consistent with a reading of Pyramid as cultural regurgitation; but when we examine the text closely we find that he fails to make precisely the kinds of claims and invocations which would make such an interpretation work.

In both these examinations, we are also confronted with a deferral of orthodoxy. The animating narrative of the novel is presented as flying in the face of conventional astronomical and antiquarian discourse; but when this orthodoxy is in fact examined in the text (mainly in citations from guidebooks,) it invariably turns out to agree precisely with Catherine and Rutherford's (supposedly increasingly unorthodox) theories.  Thus, Catherine's Peruvian guidebook tells her, in so many words, that thousands of years ago miraculous white civilizers brought agriculture and precise astronomical and surveying techniques to Peru; Rutherford's tells him that the Pyramid preserves a divine metrology which is commensurate with the Imperial system.  Even the academics they consult, e.g. von Dechend, despite their "absolute scholarly caution," cannot even parrot orthodoxy, but plunge immediately into amplifications of the ostensibly "unorthodox."

So where is the orthodox astronomy and archaeology from which the heterodox findings of Catherine and Rutherford are to be distinguished?  Allegedly in the person of Ahmed Aziz, the Director of Egyptian Antiquities, who, (like Sir William Flinders Petrie,) is "an undisputed expert on certain areas of Ancient Egyptian pottery" (322).  But here, finally, we seem to reach an aporetic climax; for, it turns out, Aziz clearly knows nothing at all about Egyptology, or if he does he refuses to make use of it.  Senator Kurtz, prior to his interview with Catherine and Rutherford, commands Aziz,

"Tell them their theories are quite wrong.  Tell them their ideas are not new, they have all been discussed in the public domain and that, interesting as they may be, they have no foundation in reality.   They will try to get you to discuss their points in a rational manner.  You must not engage with them. (323)"

Aziz displays his fidelity by depending solely (and rather incongruously) on force of rhetoric; but why he should do this, or why the Senator should command him to, is radically unclear, since of course it is factually true that "[their theories] have all been discussed in the public domain and...they have no foundation in reality."  The discussion has been going on, (with incrementally diminishing volume,) for well over a hundred years, providing an enormous sourcebook of refutations which are ready-made for theories like those of Catherine and Rutherford, and are available to anybody with minimal research facilities.  Aziz, then, is the sole locus of orthodoxy in the novel, but on examination he turns out to be completely jejune.

These aporetics are too consistent to be accidental.  There is a structure to their inconsistency, a systematicity which, once intuited, cannot be ignored.  What this systematicity betrays, I want to argue, is Martin's intimate familiarity with the discourse of 19th century Orientalist metrology, and the deliberate nature of its nihilistic reconfiguration in Pyramid.  Once we appreciate the aporetics of Catherine, Rutherford, and Ahmed Aziz in light of the Victorian complex of archaeology and astronomy (in its capacity as adjuvant to the colonial project,) we must also appreciate that Martin has succeeded in raising the cop-out to a hitherto unanticipated level of immanence, with alarming results.

III

All I know is what you've told me about Osiris and what little I can remember from school.

Tom Martin, Pyramid

Another example of obedience is the monk Mark, who while copying a manuscript was suddenly called by his abba; so immediate was his response that he did not even complete the circle of the letter O that he was writing. On another occasion, as they walked together, his abba saw a small pig; testing Mark, he said, "Do you see that buffalo, my child?" "Yes, father," replied Mark. "And you see how elegant its horns are?" "Yes, father," he answered once more without demur.

Told of Abba Sylvanus, Apophthegmata Patrum (Alphabetical Collection)

In the symbological novel, the primary function of the cop-out is ideological re-containment.  This function is executed by the revelation that what had previously been perceived the object of the code, pursued by the subjects of symbology, is in fact already constituent of their subjectivity; that what seemed to be a heterogeneity is in fact an identity.  Through this process, the destabilizing potential for its pursuers' epistemology which the mystery appeared to contain, embodied in the "feeling of mild dread" which prompts Catherine's internal lament, "Oh no, not more dismantling of received history," (80) is defused, and moreover is transmuted into substantiation of ideological platitudes with which they began: the planet should be cared for; women should be respected; "it is nothing, it is a symbol."

The series of aporetics Martin has developed in Pyramid, and the deferral of orthodoxy which they accomplish, constitute an immanent, totipotent cop-out.  Its ultimate effect is to exclude the destablizing potential of the alterity in history by subjecting the existence of any alternative account to that developed by Catherine and Rutherford to the same process to which the code is subjected in the more familiar, narrative cop-out.

Catherine and Rutherford's evolving theory is constantly presented as being in frank opposition to a putative orthodoxy.  However, all the sources they draw on (von Dechend, guidebooks, ageing Peruvians,) always already agree with them.  The only actual representative of orthodoxy in the novel is Ahmed Aziz.   As an Egyptian public official concerned with antiquities, he evokes Mahmud al-Falaki, and as an archaeologist of Ancient Egypt he evokes Sir William Flinders Petrie.  Aziz therefore represents the theoretical alternatives to the Smythian moral metrology, which are, 1) indigenous arrogation of the Bringers of Light as ancestors or 2) rejection of the system's premise in favor of a materialist empiricism; these are also the two interpretations of the pyramid which bracket Piazzi Smyth chronologically.  But, crucially, when they ask him to critique their arguments, he has nothing to offer but vitriol.  As instructed, he does not engage in any way with their argument.  He is neither al-Falaki, nor Flinders Petrie.  He is nothing; he is a symbol; a symbol of the possibility that alternate accounts, whether corroborative (like al-Falaki's) or antagonistic (like Flinders Petrie's) are recoverable with precision from history, and that they have literal relevance to the account being given by the protagonists.  But like the Benben stone, he dissolves into metaphor, leaving Catherine and Rutherford unchallenged in their subjection to ideology.  He thus colludes with von Dechend, with their innumerable guidebooks, and with every other element of the plot to cement their insulation from any alternative to their vapid recapitulation of Piazzi Smyth's discredited metrology.

This meta-cop-out is far more disturbing than the more familiar one.  In Poimandres' insipid environmentalism, we see an operation of ideological re-containment directed at the reader.  But in Ahmed Aziz, we see an operation which attempts to annihilate the epistemological possibility of all alternative accounts.  The perpetual deferral of orthodoxy results in a pervasive indifferánce with respect to everything but the insipid substance of Catherine and Rutherford's theory, which is itself the subject of the narrative cop-out and therefore strongly irrelevant.  This is symbological totalitarianism, and I hope I have shown convincingly that it is deliberate.

Heretofore, Kingdom has been generally considered an experimental symbological novel, while Pyramid has been cast as a programmatic genre-piece.  This division should be revised in light of the interpretation proposed above.  Far from being simply a programmatic articulation of the conventions of the symbological novel, Pyramid attempts to push those conventions to what Martin clearly thinks are their logical conclusions.  And, as has already been noted, these conclusions are disturbing in the extreme.

The Code Is Missing: Orthognosis at the End of the World

1.

Recent work in our field has centered on the elaboration of the logic of symbology through the systematic variation of the possible combinations of the elements of the generative grammar of symbology (orthognosis, mythognosis, etc.). The generative grammar is the symbological Urphänomenon that allows us to recognize symbology among instances of the type that often exhibit dramatic phenotypical difference, but which occupy the same cultural niche by operating according to the same basic developmental structures and desire for the stability of meaning and the erasure of contradiction from our form of life through the integration of potentially subversive knowledge into the status quo. 

Albert and Allen Hughes nauseating Christian symbologist movie The Book of Eli (2009) represents a novel and hopefully unique form of symbological fiction in which the code itself has been destroyed but continues to govern in absentia through the intuitive orthognostic attempts to reinstate its own normal functioning through the dissemination of defunct facile wisdom. A religious war ends in a global apocalypse that has left the Earth and human civilization in ruins. In the aftermath of the disaster, unnamed combatants systematically destroyed all of the world's bibles except for one, which is in the possession of Eli (Denzel Washington). God has spoken directly to Eli and instructed him to walk West until he reaches a "safe place" for the bible. Thirty years later he is still walking. God has promised to protect Eli on his journey, a promise God keeps by making Eli a superhuman ninja warrior. On his journey Eli counters various road agents and villainous post-apocalyptic bike gangs, all of which he mercilessly slaughters through the grace of God. Although the movie's action revolves around the possession of the bible—now literally the book, being the only remaining one of its kind—it isn't named until over halfway through the movie.


The film is occasioned by Eli's encounter with Carnegie, the ruler of a small town somewhere in California's sun-scotched central valley. Carnegie is our cacognostic villain and is interested in expanding his domain by acquiring a copy of the bible. "It's not a book," Carnegie explains to Eli, "It's a weapon aimed right at the hearts and minds of the weak and desperate. It will give us control of them." Carnegie has come to understand in theory that supplementing his Repressive State Apparatus with an Ideological State Apparatus would provide him with an economy of power enabling significant expansion of his domination, but he lacks the means to interpellate his subjects. "I don't have the right words, but the book does." Carnegie pursues his ends not through the code—the code having been eliminated with civilization's reservoir of knowledge—but by sending out gangs to bring him back every book they can find. Carnegie's name is an interesting hold over from the pre-apocalyptic world of symbology and mythognosis: the movie only refers to the possibility of a faux-subversive anti-capitalist message by naming its villain after an American industrialist, it does not follow through on the allegory in a the way a Dan Brown novel would. This kind of ideological recontainment of the potentially subversive has ceased to function and all that is left are bare names. 


When Carnegie meets Eli he immediately recognizes him as a fellow subject through Eli's unstoppable ninja powers and attempts to recruit him to his gang. Carnegie sends his virgin prostitute Magdalen to seduce Eli, but he refuses her advances and instead converts her by sharing a meal over which he says grace. Her conversion to Christianity is interesting insofar as it is completely empty. Eli doesn't explain why he says grace before dinner and refuses to discuss the book with Solara. Her conversion consists in her desire to follow Eli. Carnegie it seems is correct, the book does have the power to compel simply through rhetoric. When Solara returns from Eli's rooms Carnegie deduces that Eli must be in possession of the book when he sees Solara unsuccessfully attempting to say grace with her mother, a feat she cannot accomplish because she cannot remember the word "amen." Carnegie attempts to take the book by force and Eli slaughters another batch of his men before setting out across the desert.

Solara, compelled by the literal word of God, follows Eli against his wishes and is further converted through the beauty of the Lord's Prayer. Carnegie pursues them with yet more men and Eli gives up the book rather than let Carnegie kill Solara. As soon as he loses the book he is immediately deprived of his ninja powers and Carnegie shoots him. Power, it seems, is identical to the possession of the bible. Solara, having been converted enough to acquire some minimal ninja powers, escapes Carnegie and returns Eli. Together they travel to fucking Alcatraz where they join a heavily armed monastery equipped with a scriptorium and a printing press. There Macolm McDowell is attempting to restore civilization by restoring its books, but they don't yet have a bible. Meanwhile, Carnegie and Tom Waits are trying to pick the lock Eli placed on his bible, but when they are finally successful they discover—gasp!—it's written in brail which Carnegie can't read! Cut to Eli, who has memorized the bible, dictating it to McDowell before dying. The film ends with a triumphant montage of bibles being churned out by prison printing press and Solara taking up Eli's sword and sunglasses before going out into the world, her conversion completed in her transformation from a helpless prostitute into a zealous warrior of God. Knowledge is indeed something you collect in the way you collect baseball cards: it effects no internal changes in the characters, instead serving only to install them as subjects, "subject" in The Book of Eli meaning "brutal militant."

2. 

The sign is illegible.

The Book of Eli takes place in a strange post-cop-out universe where the injunction to disseminate facile wisdom has been complicated by the wholesale destruction of the symbolic order. The absence of the code has rendered mythognosis inoperative and with it the symbologist. What is left is a world of orthognostics, cacognotistics and the abject subjectless masses. The transcendental referent has been obtained, but all discourse around it has evaporated. What remains of the facile wisdom of the ancients is its material support, the physical book that Eli protects until such a time as the symbolic can be restored through the dissemination of "knowledge" in the forms of bibles and encyclopedias. For The Book of Eli the transcendental signified that grants unimaginable power is, surprisingly, the facile wisdom as such of the nonfunctional symbolic order. In order to go on, the orthognostic must reinstall the old order of things. The bible is last seen in the hands of the larval-mythognostic McDowell, who rather than reading from it simply places it on a shelf in a library where a space has been left for it, thereby restoring to the symbolic order the point de capiton that allows for its rational organization. The bible is still "the" book, but it has ceased to be so in an actual, physical sense and has returned to the status of master signifier.

In this world where neither orthognosis nor cacognosis can function normally, their respective attitudes toward the code having lost their point, they are differentiated by their attitude toward the violence that makes them possible. Cacognosis wants power for power's sake and so makes violence its end. Orthognosis uses power in order to restore the code, though it cannot comprehend its own actions or methods. The Book of Eli could not be clearer about its understanding of Christianity. When Solara asks Eli how he knows where to walk, he explains that he "Walks by faith, not by sight."

"What does that mean?" asks Solara.

"It means you know something even if you don't know something."

What appears to be a distinction between faith and reason is frighteningly close to Zizek's Rumsfeldian formula for the unconscious functioning of ideology as "unknown knowns." "Faith" means unconscious, unquestioned action. Added to this striking scene is the fact that Eli's initial explanation of "walking by faith, not by sight" turns out at the end of the film to not have been a metaphor at all: Eli is blind and walks automatically. He not only walks by "faith", he kills by faith. Violence for Eli is completely unconscious.

The only apparent discussion of the content of Christianity is both brief and impotent.

"I got so caught up in keeping [the bible] safe, I forgot to live by what I learned from it."

"What's that?"

"Do for others more than you do for yourself."

This is a curious distillation of the essence of Christianity for a man who has memorized the bible and within the movie it is logically incoherent. The fundamental aporia that gives the lie to the movie's "Christian message" is here in the contradiction between the basic message of Christianity as one of charity and God's transformation of Eli and Solara into invincible warriors. By no stretch of the imagination is the endless and needless dismemberment of strangers "doing more for others." The result is clear: "Faith" is another word for "ideology" and the content of Christianity is a contradiction coextensive with the contradictions that inspire symbology in the first place. "Christianity" in The Book of Eli stands in for the existing order of things that the symbological narrative functions to maintain while absorbing anything subversive. Here is no "turn the other cheek" but the successful containment of whatever in Christianity demands change through the equation of Christianity with the existing order of the world.

The Anti-Reilly: A Foray into Symb-pological Fiction

As previous posts have suggested, any absolute distinction between the strictly symbological text and the various forms of commentary, the multifarious sub-genres and ancillary discourses that surround it simply fails to take into account the real significance of the symbological in the contemporary cultural field. As we continue to explore the border regions of symbological fiction and thought, while we will continue to subject our starting hypotheses to rigorous critique, we will also investigate the applicability of the explanatory and generative models we have developed to a far more expansive field of objects. Ultimately, by doing so we will be able to situate such objects within a dynamic, constantly evolving system whose evolution is coterminous with the genesis of new objects within the shifting coordinates of the system. "A text is not only the product of a pre-existing combinatorial system," Todorov tells us, "it is also a transformation of that system." The exhaustive consideration of objects which would admit valid scrutiny along these lines would admittedly be a gargantuan and largely thankless task. Therefore, my undertaking for today, by elevating a particular object to the status of a representative sample, attempts to extrapolate broader conclusions about the combinatorial matrix that brought the text into existence and how, in turn, it alters the possibilities of production within that matrix.

The Rule of Four, by Ian Caldwell and Dustin Thomason (hereafter CT), received accolades from most of the major critical organs of the mainstream press upon its appearance in 2004. These accolades assumed a remarkably predictable form, a fact which is unsurprising given that the book appeared within a year of The Da Vinci Code: almost all compare it to the latter work, specifically in order to assert that it is "better," "more cerebral," "better-written," "smarter," and so on, occasionally with the aid of a further comparison with The Name of the Rose or The Secret History. Now, the basic lexicon of such assessments should be familiar to us from the heterogeneous discursive area I have designated symb-pology (A). If the symb-pologists (A) who seem to have achieved unchallenged hegemony in the feuilletons of our nation over the past few decades were so eager to heap their endorsements on CT's debut, this should not surprise us, because, it seems to me, it was written largely for them and in line with their requirements, insofar as The Rule of Four essentially excludes the main destabilizing threat to symb-pology (A), which would be precisely the lure of symb-pology (B): namely, the existence and relevance of the referent. How indeed can we be so certain that the laudatory remarks published in the New York Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Washington Post, Publishers Weekly refer to what symb-pological discourse tends to think of as "form" (although not generally using that word) and what we would classify as "the elaboration of the code"? Because it is impossible for our symb-pologist friends to be referring to anything else, since the novel never gives us anything other than the elaboration of the code. In other words, CT assiduously avoid what we might call the cacognostic seduction of the reader by refraining throughout the unfolding of the plot from the claim that the object of the code is anything other than strongly irrelevant. There is never the promise of an unsuspected point de capiton - the body of Mary Magdalene, the Benben Stone - which would supposedly, if brought to light, require us to reorient ourselves radically vis-à-vis the totality of our knowledge. Rather, we are presented throughout the novel with a pursuit of the code that is by definition only relevant to those already possessing a specialized knowledge of the Italian Renaissance, with scholarly advancement and recognition the only projected consequences of its successful decipherment, and even these never alluded to as particularly significant goals of any of the pursuers. Admittedly, the code unsurprisingly turns out to be, literally, a treasure map, and specifically purports to lead to a hidden stash of great Renaissance works of art rescued by humanist Francesco Colonna from the ravages of the fanatical Savonarola. However, because until the last few chapters of the novel we are given no sense whatsoever of what the code's referent might be, we are instead expected to devote all of our readerly attention to the ultimately rather tedious process of decipherment undertaken by the narrator, Tom, and his friend Paul - in other words, to the "puzzles" and "riddles" and "enigmas" so beloved of symb-pologists (A), entirely for their own sake. Furthermore, the only conceivable response to the final revelation about Colonna's secret chamber of masterpieces is to lapse into the same attitude of banal reverence towards an utterly generic, featureless, ahistorical version of the artistic heritage of the West that is the province of the average tourist visiting the Louvre, or Florence. Such an attitude, of course, plays a crucial instrumental function in the narrative unfolding of the strictly symbological novel, but to the extent that it is reasserted as a form of respectably secular pseudo-spirituality at the end (which it generally is), it serves to plug the gap created by the retraction of the possibility of cacognostic enjoyment of the referent. That is to say, for instance, that Langdon's (quasi-pornographic) appreciation of the Washington D.C. skyline at the close of The Lost Symbol compensates for the postponement of the promised irruption of the transcendental signified. The revelation that the code hidden within Colonna's Hypnerotomachia leads to a secret collection of lost masterpieces is, in contrast, in excess of what CT lead us to expect for most of the novel, during a good part of which the reader is inclined to concur with the systematic indifference of the protagonist's friends and girlfriend, who regard his pursuit of the code as an eccentric hobby.

The standard symbological novel represents the movement from mythognosis - that is to say, the enjoyment of the code for its own sake, which is the starting position of, say, Langdon - towards an imaginary orthognosis which is in fact identical to cacognosis - that is to say, the pursuit of the referent, understood as relevant and efficacious. The confrontation with the vacuity of the referent and the cacognostic villain's obscenely incongruous investment in it provides the exemplary induction into true orthognosis, which is none other than indifférance towards the strong irrelevance of both code and referent, permitting narrative closure (the cop-out) and ideological recontainment (the injunction to disseminate facile wisdom). In his scintillating analysis of Temple, Prandleforth noted that "In Reilly, there is one class and one position, that of the male cacognostic. The female characters are vapid sources of sexual contamination, and the orientals are comprehensively primitive and basically mute. The position of the mythognostic is empty, as is the position of the orthognostic. There are no Catherines in Reilly, no Poimandres. All the characters are cacognostics who believe in the literal significance and relevance of the code. Because of this, there is no progression from mythognosis through cacognosis to orthognosis - i.e., there is no plot, and no cop-out." To make explicit what I believe should be obvious by now, The Rule of Four gives us precisely the inverse situation: a world in which mythognosis - pursuit of the code for its own sake - is the only subject position available outside of the default apathy of the majority. CT populate their strangely orientalized Princeton with a few Langdons and Rutherfords, whose activities indeed generate the vortex around which the plot spins, but this is a world without Bezumovs, Mal'akhs and Silases, a world in which the latter are, in fact, unimaginable. The only two candidates for a cacognostic subjectivity, the grotesque Princeton professor Vincent Taft and his estranged friend and collaborator, art collector Richard Curry, differ neither in motive nor in approach from the mythognostic heroes, Tom and Paul, in that they do not seem to anticipate any major consequences of successful decipherment of Colonna's text apart from possible scholarly fame. The main problem is that their prolonged failure at deciphering the Hypnerotomachia has left them somewhat unhinged, evidently because they are unable to persuade themselves, in symb-pological manner, that the code is supposed to be "fun" - the same misunderstanding which turns Paul into a malnourished insomniac and estranges Tom from his girlfriend Katie, who understandably never manages to extract herself from the self-satisfied torpor of orthognosis (f). Both Taft and Curry, along with Paul and Tom's father, another Hypnerotomachia scholar, end up dead, but it should be further noted that both Paul and Taft exude a cadaverous aura throughout the novel: Taft a "misshapen ogre" whose "fat dangles from his arms as if the flesh were pulled from the bones" (132), Paul constantly underfed and skeletal - and this is not to mention Taft's research assistant and Paul's friend Bill Stein, the first character to be murdered, who is described as "a jangling skeleton of a man, an escaped ghost, a purse of bones drawn up too tight" (63). At the core of CT's novel, then, is what we might call the drive dimension of mythognosis, a Wiederholungszwang which converts the mythognostic into an undead automaton circulating around the vacuum of the absent referent of the code. If Paul is reborn in the final chapter, after vanishing years before into the catacombs beneath Princeton, supposedly having now discovered Colonna's stash, this only makes the point clearer: the endlessly postponed union with the referent only comes with his annihilation. And it is here, in any case, that CT reconverge with Dan Brown and other more orthodox symbologists: Tom's final redemption, in the concluding paragraphs of the novel, consists of an utterly banal fantasy of touristic pleasure in the sights of Florence ("On the ceilings where I am going there will be saints and gods and flights of angels. Everywhere I walk there will be reminders of all that time cannot touch"), reminding us that all any of us really need is a good holiday.

CT certainly accomplished one important task with their pioneering variation on the symbological genre, and for this they have been deservedly praised: they made the symb-pologist (A)'s job a lot easier. No longer troubled by the embarrassing forays into "wacko conspiracy theories," pleased with the seamlessness by which the irruption of the referent never even momentarily appears to coincide with anything other than the vigorous confirmation of obviousnesses, the latter may all the more readily assume his or her task of enjoining us to immerse ourselves with glee once again in the circuits of capital, reassured that automatistic circulation around a void is, of course, the province of eccentrics and academics.

Towards a Grammar of Symb-pology

The release, over the past six months, of what will undoubtedly be remembered as two landmark works of symbological and quasi-symbological narrative, viz. Brown's The Lost Symbol and Cameron's Avatar, has provided crucial stimuli to our own meta-critical enterprise, whose formalization as a science proceeds apace. I would like to devote this post, however, to a related phenomenon that the release of these two massively popular works has allowed us to bring into focus: the patterns of rhetorical functioning of the ancillary discourse which we have come to designate "symb-pology."

"Symb-pology" refers to the entire heterogeneous body of commentary generated by the appearance of a symbological or quasi-symbological narrative which takes up the task of replicating, reinforcing, and/or rendering explicit the propositions instantiated by the portions of the symbological narrative we call the "cop-out" and the "injunction to disseminate facile wisdom" (see Prandleforth et al.'s "Glossary of Narrative and Rhetorical Strategies" [2008]). Since it is a widely observed fact that symb-pological discourse flourishes spontaneously in a wide variety of media and fora as a perlocutionary effect of the symbological narrative's successful interpellation of its audience, it is unnecessary to attribute its pervasive presence in the cultural sector of the mainstream press to the latter's toothless acquiescence to the vulgar priorities of the publishing and film industries, tempting as it may be to do so. Rather, such relationships, while real, must be read as themselves symptomatic of the broader structures of complicity which the detailed analysis of symbological fiction may help us bring into view, while all symb-pological utterances should be understood, a priori, as overdetermined in the highest degree imaginable.

I will confine myself, in this context, to providing examples from the critical discourse generated by TLS and Avatar. Nevertheless, my prolonged observations of symb-pological discourse over the past several years have led me to a broader conclusion which I believe to be generally applicable: the possible subject positions of the symb-pologist are constrained in a manner homologous with those available to the symbological protagonist.

More specifically, I would like to propose the following grid as a generative framework for symb-pology:

Form Content

Symb-pologist A (mytho-) Y X

Symb-pologist B (caco-) X Y

The discourse of symb-pologist B is, as should be obvious from this representation of the matter, generated as a strict reversal of the discourse of symb-pologist A, and vice versa. Furthermore, as the parenthetical prefixes indicate, both discourses function partially as a continuation of the major available discourses of the symbological text itself (N.B. orthognosis is, by definition, unavailable outside of the specrtral space of alterity [Orient/Woman] demarcated by and in the text.) I should note that there is, as far as I have been able to determine, nothing that renders a symb-pologist C (YY) strictly unthinkable, but the almost exclusive dominance of A's and B's is, in strictly empirical terms, absolutely irrefutable (Roger Ebert's review of Avatar is arguably an interesting exception). The impossibility of a symb-pologist D (XX) position should be obvious from the definition of the discourse provided above.

Symb-pologist A's essential proposition may be stated in condensed form as follows: "[Insert name of symbological work] may be stupid and pointless in the end, but who cares? It was a good read/fun/beautiful/riveting." Which we might translate: "[Insert name of symbological work] was an effective formal exercise, so why worry about the particular content that was plugged in to it?" It should be clear from this that symb-pologist A's basic move is to assume the symbological work's own disavowal of its ostensible driving commitment to the pursuit of some potent knowledge (about the Grail, suppressed matriarchies, ecology, etc.) - that is, the cop-out - at face value, and moreover, to position himself as a petulant defender of the work's right to engage in this disavowal. Implicit in symb-pologist A's discourse is what we might call a superego injunction to enjoy. In other words, other readers/viewers who might be less willing to swallow a blatant discarding of what were posed as the work's guiding epistemological and moral premises are themselves missing the point - i.e. to enjoy the book film, to have fun with it - in a potentially dangerous way.

Although it is likely to be found in any of the major feuilletons and cultural organs of the media establishment, the staff of the New Yorker magazine has recently excelled in symb-pology A, as evidenced by Adam Gopnik's review of The Lost Symbol, in which he helpfully reminds us us that "Much of it is bogus, to be sure—though modern Masonry borrowed some oogah-boogah from the Egyptian past, it was an Enlightenment club, whose greatest product was 'The Magic Flute,' and which was about as sinister, and secretly controlled about as many governments, as the Royal Order of Raccoons in 'The Honeymooners.' But Brown is having fun." In David Denby's rhetorically similar review of Avatar, the formalism of symb-pology A appears in a more explicit form. Denby enjoins us as follows: "let’s not dwell on the sentimentality of Cameron’s notion of aboriginal life—the movie is striking enough to make it irrelevant. Nor is there much point in lingering over the irony that this anti-technology message is delivered by an example of advanced technology that cost nearly two hundred and fifty million dollars to produce; or that this anti-imperialist spectacle will invade every available theatre in the world. Relish, instead, the pterodactyls, or the flying velociraptors, or whatever they are—large beaky beasts, green with yellow reptile patches—and the bright-red flying monster with jaws that could snap an oak."

The partial overlap between symb-pologist A and the figure of the mythognostic should be evident. These two subjects share a formalism in their approach to the object which turns out to be simply an avowed superficiality, an insistent refusal to go beyond the pleasure of appearances. Symb-pology B resembles cacognosis only insofar as it lends ultimate significance to precise what symb-pology A dismisses as incidental and irrelevant in line with the disavowals inscribed into the work itself. While its divergence from the explicit propositions articulated in the course of the work's narrative recontainment of any ostensibly subversive content has, perhaps predictably, rendered it a less commercially viable position for the symb-pologist to adopt, symb-pology B is no less hegemonic for the fact that it does not generally appear in such prestigious venues as the New Yorker. It is rather well represented by the large class of individuals with whom I have had frequent personal contact who argue that despite the pedestrian prose and all of the Priory of Sion nonsense, the Da Vinci Code has its heart in the right place when it comes to women's rights and the Catholic Church. It is also on splendid display in this blog post on "Avatar and Postcolonial Theory," whose author concludes: "at the end of the day, the movie does dramatize the important possibility of a colonizer learning, growing, and changing his mind. And according to this CNN article, it would seem that Avatar is, if anything, having a significant effect on people’s minds."

To conclude, I would like to suggest that the codification of symb-pology may help clarify further some of the priorities of our own project of critique. Our critical attention, the foregoing discussion suggests, should not be directed at any of the particular positions generated within the matrix delineated above, but rather at the conditions of possibility of the genesis of such positions. In particular, since the differentiation of positions within symb-pological discourse relies on the parceling out of "form" and "content," we must investigate both the ideological necessity of these terms as a function of the symbological text's rhetorical performance and the tendentious impoverishment of the possibilities of interpretation that their stratification represents. Our task, then, is to seek: 1) the content of the form, by way of a systematic critique of "fun," the "good read," and so on; 2) the form of the content, by way of a more thorough investigation of what underlies particular investment of a set of neighboring literary genres in spectral fantasies of originary orthognosis, and how the particular repertoire of narrative structures we have so effectively catalogued work to enact and instantiate symbological (mé)connaissance.

The Innsmouth Look: Further Intimations of the Kingdom in H.P. Lovecraft

Life is a hideous thing, and from the background behind what we know of it peer daemoniacal hints of truth which make it sometimes a thousandfold more hideous. Science, already oppressive with its shocking revelations, will perhaps be the ultimate exterminator of our human species — if separate species we be — for its reserve of unguessed horrors could never be borne by mortal brains if loosed upon the world. If we knew what we are, we should do as Sir Arthur Jermyn did; and Arthur Jermyn soaked himself in oil and set fire to his clothing one night.

H.P. Lovecraft

Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family

In a recent post, Twinglebrook-Hastings wrote:

"Many readers of Lovecraft have been struck by his motivation of banal facts of geology, architecture, genealogy, history and science combined with repeated cliches about "unutterable horror" to provide a truly upsetting result...
"Madness and death are in Lovecraft two views on one thing, for the materialist message of the Ancient Wisdom is that to understand something is to be it, thus his narrators are constantly discovering the horrible truth lies in their own biological history, either as the foundation for all human life on earth or in their genealogy."

I hope here briefly to elaborate on the status of lineage and history in Lovecraft's work.

While contemplating a photograph of the Great Pyramid at Giza taken during the ill-fated Cuddler-Shelton expedition of 1894 I, too, was struck by Lovecraft's morbid fascination with genealogy and his horror of duration.  The image of Shelton, in native dress, staring purposefully at the great enigmatic mass of stone as Cuddler squats balefully half out of the frame always evokes poignant meditations on the discontents of permanence and heredity; four months after this photograph was taken, Shelton's body was forever lost down a previously unknown vertical shaft within the Great Pyramid which has yet to be re-discovered, and Cuddler had disappeared up the Blue Nile searching, it later emerged, for his illegitimate half-breed son.  These two features of Lovecraft's work substantiate the impression that he is, if not a proto-symbologist, at least profitably interpretable by the same critical structures which have been evolved for understanding symbology.

Lovecraft's protagonists are often engaged in genealogical research, and it is typically this activity which leads them to the hideous revelations they uncover (whether directly, as in The Shadow Over Innsmouth, The Rats in The Walls, and Facts Concerning The Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family, or indirectly as in The Picture in The House).  While the hapless genealogist of Picture finds himself sheltering in the home of a freakish pre-revolutionary cannibal seemingly by chance, more often than not the unwitting researcher is drawn into ultimate horror necessarily by his investigation.  He discovers not only that the fabric of reality is infinitely more horrifying than he could ever have supposed, but that he is implicated in the newly discovered unspeakableness by heredity.  Arthur Jermyn is the miscegenated progeny of a man and a white ape; Delapore's forebearers were the cannibal shepherds of domesticated anthropoids; the narrator of Innsmouth realizes that he is slowly turning into an blasphemous amphibian.  This leads one to suspect that the protagonist of Picture's position vis a vis his cannibal host is not, in fact, coincidental to his engagement with genealogy, but that the pursuit of lineage per se draws one inexorably towards nightmare and madness.

Lovecraft also reserves a special and incongruous loathing for long spans of time.  Examples are too ubiquitous to bother enumerating here.  The antique is invariably "hideously" old.  This initially seems strange, since permanence was regarded by most authors of the period as a positive, or at worst neutral, characteristic.  I want to suggest, however, that the "hideousness" of age and the irrepressible horror of genealogy are both products of an attitude towards historicism and diachrony in general has clear analogues in the epistemology of the symbological novel.

Modern symbology, particularly as exemplified by Dan Brown, functions efficiently to generate the illusion of knowledge production at the same time as it operates to constrain knowledge and contain potentially threatening avenues of inquiry.  Most recently, in The Lost Symbol, Brown proffers "The Ancient Mysteries" and "Noetic Science" as immensely fecund, esoteric fields of study which have the power to generate truly efficacious knowledge that will fundamentally change the social, economic, political, intellectual, and physical world.  In the course of the novel, however, the ostensible object of inquiry bifurcates; the cacognostic continues to pursue the literal truth of the Code and is utterly destroyed, and the symbologist, choosing orthognosis, opts for an epistemology in which the esoteric knowledge (which for Brown includes anything not comprehended in the discursive world of USA Today) is replaced by trite ideological commonplaces which, through a kind of legerdemain, retain investiture with the mystique originally accorded the esoteric knowledge they have replaced.  Common sense is thereby substantiated and rejuvenated, and the subject of ideology re-contained.

Lovecraft's attitude to time and lineage can be seen to produce an analogous result.  His stories open with the suggestion that genealogical research is intrinsically fascinating and worthwhile; after all, the well-educated and sympathetic young protagonist is travelling all over New England doing it.  But invariably, it leads to the sort of revelation to which self-immolation is the only conceivable response, and after which we long only "to flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age."  Likewise the hideousness of age; the only products of inquiry into the remote past are the remnants, and the revenants, of beings who as merciless and hostile as they are powerful and alien.

Just as the symbological novel gives the illusion of being a source of knowledge and intrigue while functioning as an abattoir for both, Lovecraft gives the impression of antiquarianism, but on examination his stories uniformly imply that the only possible result of historical inquiry, genealogical or otherwise, is the discovery of things whose concealment was the condition of the investigator's existence.

All of the foregoing may be read as a further articulation of Twinglebrook-Hastings' astute observation that "Kingdom's characters are Brownian people in a Lovecraftian universe."  Nancy Kelly is a character more Brownian than Brown himself has yet produced.  Katherine Solomon is a pale emanation of her determined orthognosis (or, "orthognosis(f)" as we should probably call it in order to distinguish the permanent, natural orthognosis of the female subject of symbological knowledge from the vulnerable and hard-won orthognosis(m) of the male subject).  Indeed, it is difficult to resist the conjecture that Kingdom is a programmatic exploration of what a symbological novel in which the only protagonist is constantly orthognostic(f) might look like.  But where does her quest for her surrogate father lead her?  Towards a horrifying realm of unimaginable antiquity where, in fact, human immolation is a regular and hallowed practice, which occupies precisely the relation to humanity that Nature (broadly construed to include Nyarlathotep, Chthulhu, etc,) does, and whence the object of her quest was drawn by the search for his own father.

Thus Martin, ever the synthetic genius, draws together the anti-epistemological function of the classic symbological novel and Lovecraft's anti-diachronism to produce, in our final view of Nancy Kelly, a subject who has successfully rejected both knowledge and diachrony and can bask eternally in a present which is identical with ideology and simultaneously considers itself utterly sui generis.  He has achieved the final object which Brown and Lovecraft indicate: idiocy ex nihilo.

"Avatar": Orthognosis and the Late Imperialist Imagination

The controversy elicited by James Cameron’s latest multimillion dollar cinematic extravaganza, “Avatar,” which has been lauded by critics and flocked to by audiences, has thus far unfolded along predictable lines.  Conservatives have attacked the film as covert environmentalist propaganda, harking back to the days when their predecessors sought hidden communist messages in Hollywood productions – somehow ignoring the fact that Cameron has been quite explicit about the film’s ostensible ecological agenda.  Meanwhile, the left, broadly defined, has debated whether the film’s presumably benign and laudable earth-hugging message is marred by its patronizing representation of the Na’vi, the natives of the planet Pandora, which has been invaded by rapacious humans eager to exploit its rich supply of a substance called “unobtanium.”  The Na’vi look like a cross between E.T., the Maasai, and the Mohawks, cannot seem to open their mouths without uttering a barrage of portentous metaphors, and the film’s portrayal of them generally consists of a predictable pastiche of National Geographic clichés.  Certain critics have seized on the fact that these benevolent, nature-loving natives evidently require the paternalistic intevention of the film’s hero, crippled ex-Marine Jake Sully, to save their primordial ecotopia from the ravages of the technocapitalism that has, in the film’s futuristic scenario, already laid waste to the Earth, as proof of the incurable racism of the Hollywood imagination.

My purpose here is to suggest the fruitfulness of certain of the insights developed within our burgeoning but still marginal field for a more satisfying account of the film’s obvious contradictions, about which I think few of any political persuasion or cinematic tastes would have any doubt.  First of all, let me be as clear as possible about these contradictions, which have already been discussed in the body of criticism generated since the film's release: we have in “Avatar” a film that is perhaps the supreme recent aesthetic product of postmodern technocapitalism, the spectacular sophistication of whose seamless integration of computer generated imagery with sequences involving human actors few would dispute, which nevertheless claims to articulate a radical and thorough rejection of postmodern technocapitalism as a necessarily monstrously sadistic, genocidal, and ecocidal catastrophe to which the only appropriate ethical response is violent revolution.  Moreover, its protagonist completes his repudiation of his origins by abandoning his humanity altogether in order to exclusively occupy his prosthetic Na’vi body, which, however, was genetically engineered for him by the scientific research apparatus whose work the film explicitly exposes as instrumental to the strategies of domination of interplanetary capital.  Finally, the film has been variously identified as undertaking a critique of the Bushian War on Terror by way of its emphasis on the heavy-handed tactics of the cartoonishly malign Colonel who heads up security for the mining company exploiting Pandora's resources, even though it is more or less impossible to read its romantic portrayal of the anti-imperial revolt of the Na'vi, correspondingly, as a flattering account of the Iraqi insurgency.  

As those who have attempted to defend the film from accusations of racism and stereotyping have insisted, the Na’vi are emphatically not human beings, but rather somewhat conventional cinematic aliens, at least if you take away their feather headdresses, bead breastplates, breachcloths, and so on.  Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that one could set the same storyline in, say, the Amazon, Indonesia, or the Congo, with few significant alterations, and you would have a relatively realistic, if schematic and manichean, representation of the very real and very contemporary catastrophic impact of the extraction of raw materials on small-scale subsistence communities, the complicity of technoscience in such forms of exploitation, and the use of quasi-military mercenary force by transnational corporations.  In fact, the 2000 documentary “The Coconut Revolution” tells a by no means dissimilar story about how the beleaguered inhabitants of the island of Bouganville managed to expel the Rio Tinto mining company and achieve political autonomy.  If part of the point of the film's focus on a twelve-foot tall, blue skinned race of quasi-feline, quasi-simian humanoids rather than an exotic society somewhere in the tropics is that it is not really a celebration of, say, the armed groups in Nigeria which blow up oil pipelines or Yemeni pirates, even though it might initially appear that way, why does Cameron seem so determined to give the appearance that it might be a heroic representation of violent resistance to transnational capital, even while, by giving the film an interplanetary setting, he produces a convenient disavowal of the literal implications of this appearance?

It is here that I believe some of the terms we have developed to characterize some of the narrative motifs and operations of the admittedly distinct but overlapping sphere of symbological fiction and film may prove useful.  Prandleforth (forthcoming 2010; see also Bremselhäcker 2008) has formulated a promising model of orthognosis as the largely absent but necessary structuring term of all symbological narrative and thought.  Furthermore, the Generative Grammar (Bremselhäcker 2009) has opened up new possibilities for the exploration of symbological narrative as a variant within a broader continuum of popular narrative genres (see also Prandleforth's Reilly: Hack Novelist, Symbologist, Asshole [2009] for a cogent account of the continuities and ruptures between symbological fiction and Cold War spy fiction).  The Na'vi, whatever their resemblance to traditional objects of ethnographic study, are familiar enough for anyone aware of the basic terms of our field of study: they are what we might call the Orthognostic Other.  This prodigious but liminal figure appears in different form in many of our canonical texts: we need think only of Poimandres and his presumable Copt brethren, of the assumed but never explicitly named peoples of the utopian feminist pre-Christian Mediterranean as imagined in the Da Vinci Code, or for that matter, of Riane Eisler's Minoans and Shlain's pre-alphabetic, image-centered, matriarchal peoples of prehistoric Southern Europe.  The distant, ineffable Orthognostic Other, qua sujet supposé savoir, overlaps partially with the equally significant figure of Woman, basking in her sublime indifférance (Catherine, Katherine, Nancy, etc).  The important point about the Orthognostic Other is that, unlike the positions of Mythognostic and Cacognostic, it is not even a temporarily available position for reader or protagonist, whom the novel ultimately must reconstitute as the effectively re-contained subject of late capitalist hegemony.  The remoteness and unattainability of this exotic form of consciousness reassures him of the appropriateness, nay the necessity, of his acquiescence to the obviousnesses of his culture, and it instead remains present in its necessary absence as a flattering spectral projection of his own inert apathy. 

"Avatar" differs from its strictly symbological relatives in that, first of all, it dwells extensively on the elaboration of the Orthognostic Other, while completely leaving out its mythognostic and cacognostic counterparts.  The film's hero, Jake Sully, proceeds from a subject position that is not even cacognostic or mythognostic, and indeed, neither of these subject positions are available in "Avatar."  Its best candidate for a mythognostic is Dr. Grace Augustine, a Jane Goodall-esque scientist who has lived among the Na'vi as well as developed the eponymous "avatar" program at the center of the film's drama, in which prosthetic Na'vi bodies are generated for humans to occupy (ostensibly because humans cannot breathe Pandora's atmosphere, but also so as to facilitate a benign, paternalistic colonialism in which the Na'vi are taught English and generally persuaded to cooperate with the corporation in their displacement from their sacred territory).  However, her strong mythognostic credentials - she seems, in essence, to think that the Na'vis' orthognostic union with nature is a matter of great "scientific" interest, but that it has no implications beyond satisfying her personal curiosity - are compromised by the film's insistence on the instrumentalization of knowledge by corporate interests.  The mining corporation which has colonized Pandora only funds her research because of its direct utility to their techniques of domination and exploitation, and its representatives are quite explicit about this fact.  What the foregoing should suggest is that the dominant subject position of the film, that occupied by the corporate hegemons and their military henchmen, is not even cacognostic, because, for all their avowals of the instrumentalities of knowledge in the pursuit of power, this pursuit is ultimately not invested in any mediating symbolic forms whatsoever.  They are, in short, creatures of vulgar economic determinism, driven exclusively by the accumulation of capital, fully aware of the fact and prone to articulate it incessantly in a forthright, exaggeratedly demystified manner.

It is crucial to note here that this figure, the subject of vulgar economic determinism, is largely absent from symbological fiction, an absence made interesting by the important relation this figure bears, in "Avatar," to its ostensible opposite, the Orthognostic Other.  The Na'vi and the interplanetary corporate conglomerate backed up by brutal force turn out to be marked by an extensive series of resemblances and correspondences.  Take their respective power structures: the triangular structure of power among the human protagonists, with interplanetary capital supplemented by the male-dominated RSA of the Colonel and the female dominated ISA of Augustine, is identical in form to the tribal hierarchy of the Na'vi, where the male chief is backed up by a male head warrior and female shaman.  The extensive human installation in technological prostheses is similarly parallel to the Na'vi's relationship to their animal prostheses, horse and pteradactyl-like beings into which they plug a tendril-like supernumerary limb in order to control their movements.  The total integration of mind and nature always already achieved in the Na'vi's orthognostic inertia is also the explicit goal of both Augustine's research and the military technologies used by the Colonel to bring Pandora under the more effective control of corporate power.  Meanwhile, one of the consequences of their position of absolute orthognosis is that the cultural practices of the Na'vi appear to have no necessity - since they enjoy unmediated psychic integration with their surroundings and seem to exist as a unified collective mind, it is unclear why they would need to possess language or rely on sign systems at all, much less engage in the complex symbolic mediations of ritual.  If all symbolic action is therefore rendered entirely supplementary and decorative, their situation is, in fact, identical to that in which the deracinated, "wired" subject of late technoscientific capitalism perceives himself to be.  

The originary orthognosis of the Na'vi, then, is quite clearly global techno-capitalism's spectral image of itself.  The Na'vi harmony with nature, which permits them to instrumentalize its abundance without conflict, violence, or resistance, is the corporation's domination of nature minus the contradictions it generates.  Orthognosis, similarly, turns out to name the way that the imaginary relation to knowledge into which we are installed must appear to us, at least in certain prevalent narrative forms.  The Orthognostic Other reminds us of the necessity of our assuming this position by allowing us to forget that we are assuming it.